Group-buying ads seeking a minimum number of customers before the deal expiry are increasingly used by daily-deal providers. Unlike traditional web ads, the advertiser's profits for group-buying ads depend on the time to expiry and additional customers needed to satisfy the minimum group size. Since both these quantities are time-dependent, optimal bid amounts to maximize profits change with every impression. Consequently, traditional static bidding strategies are far from optimal. Instead, bid values need to be optimized in real-time to maximize expected bidder profits. This online optimization of deal profits is made possible by the advent of ad exchanges offering real-time (spot) bidding. To this end, we propose a realtime bidding strategy for group-buying deals based on the online optimization of bid values. We derive the expected bidder profit of deals as a function of the bid amounts and dynamically vary the bids to maximize profits. Furthermore, to satisfy time constraints of the online bidding, we present methods of minimizing computation timings. Subsequently, we derive the real-time ad selection, admissibility, and realtime bidding of the traditional ads as the special cases of the proposed method. We evaluate the proposed bidding, selection, and admission strategies on a multimillion click stream of 935 ads. The proposed real-time bidding, selection, and admissibility show significant profit increases over the existing strategies. Further experiments illustrate the robustness of the bidding and acceptable computation timings. 
INTRODUCTION
Web-based deals offering deep discounts to a group of online buyers on products and services constitute a fast-growing market. Group-buying deals attract new customers as well as guarantee customer traffic within a stipulated expiry date for local businesses like restaurants and tour operators [Woo and Fowlr 2011] . Most of these group-buying deals are sold by intermediaries like Groupon, Groupbuy, and many other daily deal providers. Although these intermediaries depended on email-based marketing models in the past, banner ads in social networking and other sites are increasingly used to attract deal customers.
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To maximize the profits while bidding for group-buy ads, bidders have to minimize cost by bidding low, but they still have to win a sufficient number of conversions to satisfy guarantees before the deal expiry. Bidding high increases the probability of winning impressions and thereby improves the chance of the deal tipping. On the contrary, higher bids increase the payment to the exchange, thereby reducing profit. Hence, bids need to be optimized considering these two conflicting pulls. This maximal profit bidding necessitates dynamic bid optimization based on the time to expiry and the number of received conversions. We address this problem of maximizing deal bidder profits by real-time optimization of bids to minimize the cost of impressions while satisfying the deal tipping guarantees.
For group-buying deals, the traditional static bidding strategies based on optimization of expected profits from a single impression are far from optimal. A significant difference from the traditional ads is that the optimal bid value depends on the time to expiry and number of conversions required to satisfy the guarantees. For example, consider a deal requiring just a few more conversions to fulfill the guarantee. If the deal is about to expire, the advertiser would have to bid higher amounts to increase the probability of winning more impressions. On the other hand, if the time to expiry is long for the same deal, he would be better off bidding smaller amounts and winning a smaller fraction of impressions to minimize the payment to the exchange (since there would be a higher number of user visits over larger time intervals). Evidently, the optimum bid amount is a function of time-dependent parameters like the time to expiry and the additional number of conversions needed to satisfy guarantees. Due to this time dependence of optimal bids, any static bidding strategy will be suboptimal, thus necessitating real-time bidding. Fortunately, this dynamic bid optimization is made possible by the advent of ad exchanges offering real-time auctions (e.g., RealMedia, DoubleClick, AdECN).
Since revenue is conditional upon tipping the deal, the bidding strategies are significantly harder than in traditional nonguaranteed bidding. In addition to the dynamic quantities mentioned earlier, deal profit depends on a number of static quantities: pay per event, number and bid distributions of other bidders, conversion rates, and the auction mechanism [Krishna 2009; Easley and Kleinberg 2010] . Consequently, formulating and maximizing expected profits-which is a function of all these static and dynamic quantities-is significantly harder. Adding to this complexity, the optimization is online, thus necessitating low computation timings.
Our method of optimizing profit for guaranteed deals has two steps: (i) formulating the expected profit and (ii) maximizing the profit against the bid. For the first step, we derive the expected profit as a function of the bid value, time to expiry, fulfilled conversions, amount spent to buy impressions, auction mechanism, click-through rate, and the number and distribution of the other bidders. Since many of these parameters are dynamic (as described earlier), the objective function value changes as the bidding progresses. Among all these parameters, the only parameter the bidder can change is his own bid amount. Hence, we optimize the expected profit against the bid amount in the second step. When the profits are optimum, the deal bids are in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, one that is similar to traditional ads [Krishna 2009; Easley and Kleinberg 2010] .
Considering the complexity of the optimization, a closed form solution is unlikely. Although the optimization is against a single variable (i.e., bid amount), our analysis shows that the objective function is neither convex nor quasi-convex (unimodal). Consequently, an optimization method guaranteed to converge to optimal bids on every instance is unlikely. Furthermore, the derivative of the objective function is harder to solve than the objective itself. Considering these factors, we resort to direct numerical optimization (without using gradients) starting from multiple points.
Running Time Minimization
Since the optimization is online, computation time needs to be minimized. Therefore, we explore running time optimization on multiple levels. First, we use a fast converging Brent's optimizer [Brent 1973 ]. Second, we reformulate the objective for faster computation for typical parameter values. Furthermore, we approximate large binomial cumulative probability expressions with a single term normal approximation. Since the changes in the optimal bids for subsequent impressions are incremental, we reuse optimal bid values of previous impressions whenever changes are likely to be negligible.
Extensions
Interestingly, the solutions of many related problems can be directly derived from the proposed objective function. We describe the four proposed extensions below:
(i) Deal Selection. Deal selection chooses the best deals to bid to maximize bidder profits. Combining optimal bidding and selection, we derive the bidders' private value and the marginal profit increase for the impression for each deal. The deal with the highest marginal profit increase is the greedy optimal selection. (ii) Deal Admissibility. Admissibility is the problem of predicting whether bidding for a group-buying deal is likely to be profitable based on its attributes. The intermediary or the advertiser may decide to accept or reject a deal campaign based on admissibility criterion. We show that a special case of our objective function combined with the bid optimization provides effective admission control. (iii) Nonbidding Selection. For nonbidding scenarios, as when the publisher directly selects the deals to display, the proposed formulation suggests optimal selection among the inventory of deals. (iv) Nonguaranteed Ads. We show that the real-time bid optimization of traditional non-guaranteed ads is a special case of the proposed optimization. When there are no guarantees, the proposed objective function reduces to expected profits of traditional ads, yielding known optimal static bid formulations. Thus, the method serves as a unified real-time bidding strategy for both guaranteed and nonguaranteed ads, thus enabling traditional ads to adapt to changes in parameters like click-through rates [Chen et al. 2011] .
Evaluations and Results
We evaluate the proposed methods and the extensions in a query log of 9.3 million impressions of 935 ads. In our first set of experiments, we compare our profits from the proposed real-time strategy with the optimal static and base adaptive baselines. The results show that the proposed strategy significantly improves profits over the baselines. Subsequently, experiments showing improved profits in spite of violated assumptions by the competitor bids demonstrate robustness of the strategy. Furthermore, our The article is organized as follows: The next section discusses related work, followed by Section 3, on notations and the formal problem definition. Section 4 derives the expected profits and proposes the optimization method. Subsequently, we discuss running time minimizations. The next section presents extensions of the problem to deal selection, admissibility, and bidding of traditional ads. Section 7 present the experimental evaluations and results. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 8. Grabchak et al. [2011] addressed the problem of optimal selection of guaranteed (groupbuying) ads. Lappas and Terzi [2012] also considered deal selection, scheduling, and parameter estimation in nonbidding scenarios. Our work differs from these because we deal with optimal bidding, whereas these two papers do not consider bidding but rather consider the offline selection of deals. Furthermore, even the nonbidding selection subproblem discussed in our article is different because we consider a minimum number of conversions (such as deals), whereas Grabchak et al. consider an exact number of required conversions and Lappas and Terzi disregard guarantees.
RELATED WORK
Different models of group-buying auctions and bidding mechanisms have been studied [Anand and Aron 2003; Chen et al. 2002] . But our problem of bidding to sell deals online-mostly made popular after the emergence of daily-deal sites-has not been studied for any of the group-buying auction models.
Considering related problems of allocation and bidding of display ads, Ghosh et al. [2009] considered allocating guaranteed display impressions matching a quality distribution representative of the market. Vee et al. [2010] analyzed the problem of optimal online matching with access to random future samples. Boutilier et al. [2008] introduced an auction mechanism for real-time bidding of display ads.
There are a number of papers on optimal ranking of textual ads in the presence of budget limits. Mehta et al. [2007] deal with the problem of optimal allocation of textual ads considering budget limits of the advertisers. Buchbinder et al. [2007] provided a simpler primal-dual-based analysis to achieve the same competitive ratio. These papers consider ranking/allocation of textual ads rather than deals. Furthermore, these problems have an upper limit on the number of impressions rather than a lower limit, as in our problem. Hence, unlike these problems, ours is not a generalized online bipartite matching.
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With the increase of ad exchanges offering real-time bidding, there are a few papers on related problems. Chen et al. [2011] formulated the problem of supply-side allocation of traditional ads with upper bounds on budgets as an online constrained optimization matching problem. Chakraborty et al. [2010] considered the problem of ad exchanges calling out a subset of ad networks without exceeding the capacity of individual networks for real-time bidding.
With the increasing popularity of daily-deal business, there has been an increasing number of papers discussing different business aspects. In their recent papers, Byers et al. [2012a Byers et al. [ , 2012b studied the effect of daily deals on consumer reviews and the root cause of this impact. The profitability by daily deals for different types of merchants along with the possible risks and benefits have been analyzed by Edelman et al. [2011] . Dholakia [2011] studied the impact of different daily deals on merchants and spending patterns of the deal consumers. The problem of automatically allocating the user traffic of a group-buying website to different deals to maximize the total revenue was addressed by Kong et al. [2013] . The motivating factors for consumers to purchase daily deals have been studied by Byers et al. [2011] . To the best of our knowledge, the optimal bidding problem of group-buy deals and the extensions discussed in this article have not been previously addressed.
NOTATIONS AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Every group-buy deal g has a required minimum clicks m, an expiry time e, a cost per click (CPC) ρ, and a click-through rate (CTR) μ. Thus, a deal may be represented as
For the rest of the article, our discussions are based on a guaranteed number of clicks for ease of description. The discussions and results are equally applicable for guaranteed conversions (refer to Section 6 for the details) (by substituting conversion rates [CVR] for CTR and click per action [CPA] for CPC) and guaranteed displays (by setting the CTR to 1 and substituting Cost per Impression [CPI] for CTR).
Let ψ t be a binary indicator variable, with ψ t = 1 if the advertiser's bid is successful at time t (i.e., he wins the bid for impressions and pays the content owner) and zero otherwise. Let c t be the number of clicks at time t. For our discussions, the time t denotes t user visits (impression opportunities) rather than wall clock time. For a deal g, the profit P t at time t is
where h(b) is a mapping from bids to the payment whose closed form depends on the auction model, the number of other bidders, and the bid distributions. For the commonly used first-price auction for display ads h(b j ) = b j . For other auctions, such as second-price auctions, closed forms can be derived based on order statistics [Easley and Kleinberg 2010] . After fulfilling guarantees (i.e., c t ≥ m), the expected profit function for the guaranteed deals are the same as that of the traditional nonguaranteed ads. Hence, the period of interest for our analysis and experiments is the time before guarantees are fulfilled.
To maximize the profit in Equation (1), the only parameter decided by the bidder is the bid amount. Hence, we may state the profit maximization problem as:
Bidding Problem: Given a guaranteed ad g = m, e, ρ, μ and number of received conversions c t , find the bid amount b t such that the expected profit from u t user visits is maximal, where u t is the expected number of user visits before the ad expiry time e.
To explain the nature of the problem, we start by finding the optimal bid based on the expected values of parameters at t = 0. This is the best possible estimate at that point of time. As time progresses, we will get better estimates of parameters based on the actual values of number of conversions and user visits so far. Hence, we keep updating the optimal bid b t based on the current state and expected numbers in the future. We assume that u t is known because it can be generally estimated from the traffic statistics [Grabchak et al. 2011 ].
MAXIMIZING PROFIT
We derive the expected profits of group-buy deal campaigns based on the current state of the deal. Subsequently, we analyze the nature of the profit function and present a method to maximize profits in real time through bid adjustments.
Expected Profits
The click probability of a deal is
P(click) = P(click|impression)P(impression|bid).
The first factor P(click|impression) is equal to the CTR of the deal-a constant for the static auctions considered here. The second factor-probability of winning impression P(impression|bid)-is an increasing function of the bid amount. This implies that the probability of satisfying click guarantees and, consequently, the expected profit both increase with the bid amount. On the contrary, the amount paid by the bidder to the publisher (h(b)) is an increasing function of the bid amount. Hence, the profit tends to decrease with increasing bid amount. The bids need to be optimized considering these two conflicting effects on the profit.
For real-time bidding, different advertisers or intermediaries place bids for a given ad impression. Generally, the highest bidder wins and will display his ad.
2 In general, the bid values of a bidder vary either due to the bidder's private value distribution or due to a deliberate randomization done by the bidder to avoid giving advantage to the competition [Ghosh et al. 2009 ]. Hence, the event of winning is probabilistic, with a binary outcome. Furthermore, winning in consecutive bids can be assumed to be independent of each other. Hence, bidding to win impressions are Bernoulli trials with success probability increasing with the bid amount.
The users click with probabilities equal to the estimated CTR of the winning ad. This is again a Bernoulli trial with success probability equal to the CTR. Hence, these two trials-bidding and getting conversions-may be combined as a single Bernoulli trial of bidding to win clicks. The probability of success for this composite trial is equal to the product of CTR and probability of winning an impression.
For the composite Bernoulli trial just described, the number of successes follows a binomial distribution. To facilitate representing such a binomial distribution, we introduce the following two functions:
where μ is the CTR of the ad, and r t is the additional number of clicks required to satisfy the guarantees. The function denotes the probability of satisfying the guarantee, and gives the expected number of clicks, given that the guarantee is satisfied. Function d(b) is a mapping from the bid value to the probability of winning the impression. For a sealed-bid auction in which the highest bid wins (e.g., first-or secondprice auctions), this probability is d(b) = CDF (b) n−1 , where CDF is the cumulative probability distribution of the bids of other bidders, and n is the total number of bidders. To get a closed form of d(b), we need to assume a distribution function of bids. For example, if the bids are uniformly distributed between l and u,
n−1 . Similar closed forms can be derived for other distributions and even for cases where different competitors are following different distributions [Easley and Kleinberg 2010] .
At optimal profit, the bids are the best responses to competitors and hence are in a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium [Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Krishna 2009 ]. Consequently, we may limit our analysis to truthful bidding without the loss of generality, as stated by the revelation principle [Dasgupta et al. 1979] . Hence, the assumptions on bid distributions just described are equivalent to the same assumptions on private value distributions of bidders at the optimal profit outcomes. Now, the net expected profits is given by the objective function
Please refer to Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the expected profits. Intuitively, the first term gives the expected profit from already received clicks if the guarantee is satisfied; the second term gives the profit from the expected number of future clicks; and the third negative term gives the cost for already received impressions and the expected cost for the future impressions.
Optimizing Expected Profits
The expected profit in Equation (4) has to be optimized with respect to the bid amount. An option is to differentiate the function with respect to b t and solve the derivative for zero. But this is difficult since the derivative may have a large number of terms, and solving the derivative will be harder than a direct approach. Hence, a direct optimization of the objective function-as we do later-is faster. An example curve of variation of the objective function with bids is shown in Figure 1 . Two observations significant to the numerical optimization are (i) the optimization is non-convex, and (ii) the function is not even quasi-convex (unimodal). This implies that a bisection or gradient descent method may get trapped in a local optimum, and hence the convergence to the global optima is not guaranteed. Consequently, we need to start the optimization from multiple points, thus making the problem harder.
For the bidding process, the winning probability is 1 if the bid is greater than the maximum bid of the competitor's bid distribution, and it is 0 for bids of less than the minimum bids. Hence, the optimal values will always be between the maximum and minimum even without imposing external constraints. This allows a simpler unconstrained optimization. The optimizer restarts the search from multiple random starting points to avoid local minima traps (the details of the restarts are discussed in Section 5). Furthermore, since the optimization is online, fast convergence is highly desirable. Considering these factors, we adapt Brent's optimization method [Brent 1973 ].
Brent's optimization combines parabolic interpolation with golden ratio search for faster convergence. Parabolic interpolation assumes a smooth parabolic function near minimum for faster convergence. If the function is not smooth enough, the parabolic interpolation may fail. On the other hand, golden ratio search does not assume a smooth function, and many resort to a slow but sure method of three-point search to converge to a minimum. Brent's optimizer combines these two methods by using a robust golden ratio search if the function is not smooth, but falls back to the faster parabolic interpolation if the function is smooth enough. Please refer to Teukolsky et al. [Press et al. 1992] for an easily accessible description of these methods.
RUNNING TIME MINIMIZATION
The optimization of the bids has to be performed online between the impression opportunities. Evaluating objective function in Equation (4) directly may involve computing hundreds of thousands of terms. Since the time duration between the impression opportunities can be very small, the optimization time must be within acceptable limits. In addition to using a fast converging Brent's optimizer, we adopt several approximations and computational methods for improved running time.
Reducing the Number of Terms
Typically for deals, the user visits needed to get the required number of clicks are very large compared to the clicks needed for tipping the deal (i.e., u t r t ), except for a last few user visits before deal expiry. Exploiting this, we reduce the computation time by rewriting Equations (2) and (3) as Real-Time Bid Optimization for Group-Buying Ads 62:9
This rewriting may reduce computations from hundreds of thousands of terms to less than a few hundred terms.
Normal Approximation
Despite replacing u t by r t , computing binomial CDFs in Equations (5) and (6) may involve the summation of hundreds of combinatorial terms. The binomial CDF may be approximated by a single-term normal CDF for large values of u t (central limit theorem). Exploiting this, we compute and based on a normal CDF with correction for continuity [Miller et al. 1965 ]:
There is no analytical solution for this integral, but it can be looked up in a normal CDF table or can be approximated by finite analytical forms.
Similarly, approximating the standardized form of as ,
where z =
For small u t and r t , normal approximation may diverge more from the original binomial function, and computation of the binomial is less costly. Hence, it is more accurate to use actual binomial distributions for smaller r t and u t . We depend on the common rule of thumb for approximating binomial CDF by normal CDF; that is, if u t μd(b t )(1−μd(b t )) ≥ 10, we use normal approximation. Considering the optimization of the normal approximation, the sample graph of the objective function with the approximations is shown in Figure 1 . Like the original binomial objective, the normal approximation is neither convex nor quasi-convex. Consequently, optimizing the approximation faces the same difficulties as the optimization of the original objective.
Setting the Starting Points
The optimal bid values generally change only nominally for subsequent impressions of a deal. Exploiting this fact, the optimal bid for an impression is used as the starting point for optimization for the next impression. This reusing of optimal bids expedites convergence. Fig. 2 . Group-buying deal bidding extends to many related problems on specific assumptions. The guarantees can be in terms of conversions, impressions, or conversions depending on the event probabilities used (i.e., CTR, 1, and CVR). Furthermore, the objective reduces to deal selection, deal admissibility, selection of deals with no bidding, and to the optimal bidding of traditional nonguaranteed ads on various assumptions on parameters.
Multiple Starting Points
The nonconvexity of the objective requires the optimal value search to start from multiple points. Because optimal bids change only incrementally for successive impressions of a deal, we avoid restart from multiple points for every impression. For this-instead of starting from previous optimal values as described earlier-we chose random starting points for optimization for the first 20 impressions. The bid corresponding to the maximum objective value among these searches is used as the optimal value. This strategy is found to be converging to optimal values for all the deals we tested.
Recomputation Frequency
Because the change in optimal bids is nominal for subsequent impression opportunities, the previous bids can be reused. Hence we reoptimize bids only after a number of impression opportunities (every 32 impression opportunities in our experiments). Furthermore, optimal value is always recomputed if there is a click because one more click may cause a nontrivial change in the optimal bid.
EXTENSIONS TO RELATED PROBLEMS
The optimal bidding for group-buy deals is a general problem that, on specific assumptions, reduces to number of related use-cases. As a corollary, the proposed solution reduces to solutions of these problems on the same assumptions. In Figure 2 , we enumerate these extensions and assumptions on which the guaranteed bidding will reduce to these problems.
Considering the three downward branches in Figure 2 , the guaranteed bidding easily transforms to guaranteed clicks, displays, and conversions. For example, by setting μ = CTR, the deal definition in Equation (3) will define a guaranteed conversion campaign. Consequently, on the same assumption, the profit formulation in Equation (4) gives guaranteed click campaign profits. Similarly, by setting μ equal to 1 and CVR, the problem and the solution will be applicable for guaranteed impressions and conversion deals, respectively.
The four upward branches in Figure 2 illustrate reductions to related bidding and selection problems. We discuss them in the following sections, and the deal-related extensions are evaluated separately in Sections 7.3 and 7.4.
Deal Selection
Deal selection is the problem of maximizing expected profits by choosing the best deal to bid for every impression. Considering the online nature of the problem, we perform a greedy deal selection. The deal with the maximum marginal profit by the impression is selected as the winner. Expected marginal profit is calculated as the difference between the expected profit of winning the impression and failing to win the impression. Adding the bid amount to marginal profit to derive the marginal revenue:
Derivation of the equation is given in Appendix A.2. This marginal revenue is the expected private value of the impression for the deal bidder, isomorphic to the private value of the traditional ads. Similar to the traditional ads, E(v it ) − b t gives the expected profit by displaying deal i at time t.
To select a deal, the bid values of deals are optimized against the expected profits as described in Section 4. These optimal bids are substituted in Equation (8) to calculate the private values. The deal with the highest increase in the expected profit is selected for bidding. We evaluate the proposed selection in Section 7.3. Selection considering deal groups is a harder combinatorial optimization problem, and we leave this for future research.
Deal Admissibility
Admissibility criterion decides if the profit from a deal is likely to be positive. Admissibility can be directly derived as a special case of optimal bidding. More specifically, if the maximal expected profit from a deal is positive at t = 0, then the ad is admissible. At t = 0, Equation (4) reduces to
where u 0 is the expected number of visits before the deal expiry. The admissibility criterion is derived from Equation (4). The money already spent on bidding is not a factor in admissibility decision. The equation gives admissibility at an arbitrary time t, thus including ads having some clicks already. For a new ad at t = 0, the equation may be further simplified by assuming c t = c 0 = 0. To evaluate admissibility, bids are optimized for maximal profit and substituted in Equation (9). If the expected profits are positive, we consider the deal as admissible.
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The profit increase from admissibility is evaluated in Section 7.4.
Nonbidding Selection
If there are no competing bidders-that is, the number of bidders is equal to one-the problem will reduce to that of selection from competing deals. Alternatively, this scenario may be thought of as the publisher selecting deals directly. In this case d(b t ) = 1 in selection Equation (8) for all values of b t . Since this is a special case of the selection with bidding, we do not include separate evaluations because results are directly implied. Alternatively, since there is no bidding involved, selection may be modeled as an offline problem [Grabchak et al. 2011] . In this case, the selection of deal sets for maximizing the profits of deal combinations may be of interest. We leave this optimal offline selection of deal sets for future research.
Nonguaranteed Ads
As shown in Figure 2 , when the minimum click guarantee is zero, the guaranteed deal bidding reduces to the bidding of tradition nonguaranteed ads. Consequently, the expected profits for nonguaranteed ads may obtained by substituting r t = 0 in Equation (4):
Compared to the profit in Equation (4), the negative expected cost remains the same as for the guaranteed ads. On the other hand, because the payment is not conditional on satisfying guarantees, the terms accounting for the probability of the ad to satisfy the guarantee are no longer applicable. The profit from received clicks represented in the first term becomes certain, and the expected profit from future clicks in the second term reduces to the number of expected clicks times the CPC. Considering the profit from a single impression (i.e., u t = 1), and thereby ignoring the constants terms of past profits, the expected profit becomes, E(
This expected profit can be maximized with respect to the bid values. For example, for a first-price auction with n bidders and competitors having a bid distribution with cumulative distribution function of
Note that the expected profit (hence, the optimal bids) derived here is the same as the existing formulations of optimal static bid profits with traditional ads [Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Krishna 2009 ]. This is a manifestation of the broader fact that the existing bidding formulations are optimal for static environments. Hence, the optimal real-time bids will essentially be the same. In other words, real-time bidding provides no advantage over static bidding for nonguaranteed ads in static environments. On the other hand, real-time bidding would improve profits over existing bidding in dynamic environments [Chen et al. 2011] . Thus, the proposed bidding provides a strategy to account for dynamism in the parameters of traditional ads-like the changed estimates of CTR or competitor bid distributions.
EVALUATIONS AND RESULTS
We compared the profits by the proposed bidding strategy with baseline strategies of (i) optimal static bidding and (ii) basic real-time bidding. We evaluated the profit increase, running time, deal selection, and admissibility-including the robustness of our method to violations of assumptions.
Dataset:
From a click log of 330 million impressions, we randomly selected 935 ads (with 9.3 million impressions) having a minimum of 5 clicks and 1,000 impressions. The click log contains impressions and notes whether the impression resulted in a click or not.
Baseline Bidders: The first baseline bidder is an optimal static bidder. The bidder derives optimal bids as a function of the number of competitors and their bid distributions [Easley and Kleinberg 2010] and is optimal if there are no guarantees. The second baseline bidder is a basic adaptive bidder, which bids as staticOptimal + r t /u t − CTR. The strategy is intuitive because it increases a bid over the static optimal bid if the required click rate is greater than the CTR and decreases the bids otherwise. We also used the profits by placing a random bid as a baseline in our initial experiments. Random bidding performed much worse than all of the other baselines and is not plotted in the results.
Bidding Profit Comparison
To compare the profits by bidders, the proposed real-time and baseline bidders compete with random bidders for every ad in the "replayed" click log. For example, the real-time bidder places its bid for the first impression of an ad along with the competing random bidders. If the real-time bidders' bid is the highest, the bidder wins the impression. The deal wins a click if the click log indicates a click for that impression. Then the same process repeats for the second impression and so on. Similarly, other baseline bidders are made to compete with the same random bidders for the same set of ads, and the realized profits are compared. This replaying reproduces the online experiment because the user actions in the consecutive impressions are most likely from different users and hence independent. The experiments are repeated by changing every significant parameter-one at a time-to analyze the effects of different parameters.
Since the click logs are from traditional ads having no required clicks or expiry, we set the expiry timings as the number of impressions of the ad in the log. To compensate for using the traditional ads instead of deals, the required clicks are varied by a parameter sweep over the plausible range. We do not vary expiry time because the ratio of required clicks to the expiry time determines the profit-rather than the expiry time aloneand this ratio varies as we do a parameter sweep on required clicks. Furthermore, note that different ads in the set of 935 ads have different expiry timings, thus effectively functioning as a parameter sweep on expiry times. The CTR of every ad is estimated as the ratio of number of clicks to total impressions. 4 The competing bids are selected from different random distributions (bids are not registered in the click log) because the bidders generally randomize their bids to avoid competing bidders guessing their bids [Ghosh et al. 2009] . Note that this randomization in bids may be achieved by randomly choosing different deals to bid for in different time slots even for the proposed optimal bidding strategy. At the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium-in which everyone follow the optimal strategies-these assumptions on bid value distributions are equivalent to the same assumptions on private values of the advertisers, as mentioned in Section 4.1. Furthermore, the maximum entropy (i.e., minimum assumptions) uniform random competing bid distribution is the hardest to predict and optimize against (hence, we use this distribution for the experiments described later). Any other distributions, including a fixed optimized competing bid, are easier to optimize against, and the realized profits will be higher. Figure 3 (a) and show four sets of profit comparisons realized by different bidders against required minimum clicks m. In the first set of Group (10) in Figure 3(a) , there are four bidders-the bidder evaluated and three other random bidders. Random bidders bid in a uniform random distribution in the interval of [0, 0.04]. Pay per click (ρ) is set to $10 for this group. The remaining groups of experiments in Figure 3(a) and are designed to analyze the effects of changes in parameters.
Analyzing common trends in all these groups, the profit of the real-time bidder exceeds that of the baseline bidders for every m in all the experiments. As expected, the profits reduce with m. The increase in profit is as large as 70-150% (e.g., at m = 150 for Group (10) increase is (13.74 − 4.86)/4.86 = 1.45). As an exception, the profit of the real-time bidder is the same as that for the static optimal bidder at m = 0. This is an implication of the discussion in Section 6.4, that the current static optimal bidding of nonguaranteed ads are a special case of the proposed real-time bidding. As m increases from left to right, the absolute and percentage of difference between static and realtime profit increases. The baseline adaptive bidder performs worse than the static bidder for most parameter combinations because the bidding considers only a subset of parameters. This is a manifestation of the fact that a simpler intuitive adaptive 62:14 R. Balakrishna and R. P. Bhatt strategy is not likely to perform well, especially since the optimal bid depends on a large number of parameters. The baseline adaptive bidder, at m = 0, performs very similarly to (but not the same) as the static optimal bidder for uniform competitor bids (for normal distribution in Figure 4 ; they differ considerably at m = 0) because typical CTR values are very small compared to optimal bids.
The next three sets of experiments analyze the effects of each of the three parameters: ρ, bid distribution, and number of bidders. Parameters are changed one at a time with respect to Group (10) in Figure 3 (a) by a factor two. Figure 3 (plotted against the second y-axis) increases the profit due to increase in pay per click ρ. The increase in profit is more than linear to ρ since the revenue increases linearly to ρ, but the cost of impression remains the same; consequently, the profit (revenue − cost) increases many times. For Group (4) in Figure 3 (b), reduced bids of competing bidders result in lower optimal bids and thus an increase in profits. In the second set of experiments in Figure 3 (b) Group (2), the reduced number of competing bidders leads to lower optimal bids and hence an increase in profits.
The next sets of experiment in Figure 4 further relax assumptions on competing bidders. Group (G) has competing bidders having Gaussian bid distributions instead of the uniform random distribution used in the previous experiments; Group (R) evaluates the robustness of real-time bidding against a violation of assumptions. Like the uniform distribution, for the Gaussian experiments in Group (G), the real-time bidder outperforms the competitors. The profits are higher than in the uniform distributions in Figure 3 (a) Group (10) because the lower entropy of Gaussian distribution is easier to optimize against. For the robustness experiments in Group (R), the real-time and static bidders assume uniform distributions in [0, 0.04] for the three competing bidders, but two of the competing bidders bid in normal distribution. The real-time bidder still dominates over the baseline by a considerable margin. A plausible explanation for the similar profits to Figure 3 (a) Group (10) is that the effects of violation of assumption and the easier Gaussian distribution cancel each other.
Running Time Evaluation
These experiments are conducted on a shared 16GB RAM machine with two dual-core CPUs running at 2.54GHz. The running time optimizations described in Section 5 are applied (similarly to other experiments). Analyzing the objective function in Equations (5) and (6), the parameter having maximum effect on the running time is the required clicks m. The number of terms in the objective increases with m, and other parameters will have negligible effects on computation time. Hence, we evaluated mean time to optimize the bids for an impression against plausible ranges of m. Figure 5 shows that the running time increases linearly with the required clicks, as expected. The highest running time is less than 0.2 milliseconds, which is quite acceptable. 
Deal Selection
Here, we evaluate the proposed real-time deal selection described in Section 6.1. Selection is compared with the optimal static selection preferring higher private value ads, computed as CTR × CPC − bid. Among the 935 ads in the click log, we removed ads with a CTR of greater than 0.02 for these experiments. These high-CTR ads make the selection easy by dominating over other ads, hence they make it harder to distinguish selection quality. Among 823 remaining ads, we randomly created groups of four ads. Selection experiments are performed for each group separately, and mean profits among all groups are plotted. We set the bidding parameters as ρ = 20, total number of user visits as 15,000, time to expiry of each ad as the minimum of 15,000 and the number of actual impressions of the ad, number of bidders as four, and competing bidders' bids are uniform random in [0, 0.04]. For every deal, the required clicks is set uniform random between zero and the maximum value shown in the x-axis, so that we have different required click values for different deals.
To select the best ad in the group for an impression, first the bids are optimized using the real-time bidder. These optimal bids are used in Equation (8) for real-time selection and to compute the private value (i.e., CTR × CPC − bid) of the static selection. To separate improvement in profit by selection from improvement by bidding, the proposed real-time bidder is used for bidding after both the static and real-time selections. The mean realized profits are shown in Figure 6 (a). When the required clicks are zero, the real-time bidding gives the same optimal profit as the static bidding (keep in mind that the static selection is optimal when required clicks are zero). For higher values of required clicks, the real-time bidder gives considerably higher profits, with the percentage of increase in profit increasing with required clicks. The profit swings occurring at larger values of required clicks are due to the random factors in assignment of required clicks.
Deal Admissibility
The admission control proposed in Section 6.2 is evaluated by comparing mean deal profits against the profits without admission control. Similar to selection, bids are optimized and substituted in Equation (9). The deals giving positive expected profits are passed to the bidder, and mean profits are plotted. Figure 6 (b) shows that admission control improves profits by more than six times for some values of required clicks m. The profit increases for both static and real-time bidders, showing the effectiveness of admission control independent of the bidding method (as in the previous experiments, the real-time bidder performs considerably better than the static bidder). At m = 0, all ads in the click log have positive expected profits. The mean profit no longer decreases monotonically because the admission control eliminates more low-profit ads with increased m. Furthermore, the total profits of the real-time bidder with and without admissibility is almost exactly the same. This shows that there are no false negatives removed. Admission control does not increase total profits because for the ads with negative expected profits, the real-time bidder will bid zero, making the losses zero. With admissibility, the bidder incurs the same profit from much lower numbers of ads and user visits, hence he can use the remaining user visits to sell other ads.
CONCLUSION
An emerging category of online ads are the group-buy deals requiring a minimum number of purchases. For an advertiser or intermediary selling these deals, optimizing bids is necessary for maximal profits. Existing bidding strategies are suboptimal for these deals because they do not consider event minimum group-size guarantees and expiry timings. To this end, we propose a real-time bidding strategy for guaranteed deals. We derive the expected profits as a function of the dynamic and static parameters of the deals. These expected profits are shown to be nonconvex and numerically optimized against the bid values. To satisfy the stringent time constraints of online bidding, we use several approximations and running time optimizations. Exploiting the generality of the proposed formulation, we extend the solution to related problems of deal selection for bidding, admissibility, selection for nonbidding scenarios, and real-time bidding of nonguaranteed ads. Our empirical comparisons with base adaptive and existing static strategies on a multimillion click log show significant profit improvements. Furthermore, our evaluations show acceptable running time and robustness against the violation of assumptions. Evaluations of extensions show considerable profit improvement by the proposed deal selection and admissibility.
APPENDIX

A.1. Derivation of Equation (4)
Let G denote the event satisfying the guaranteed number of clicks. Let R and C denote revenues and costs, respectively:
E(P it ) = P(G)(E(R|G) − E(C|G)) − P(¬G)(E(C|¬G))
Cost: At time t, an amount equal to t−1 j=1 ψ j b j is paid for the impressions. The future expected cost is the expected payment until u t . Let D denote the total number of displays until u t 5 :
E(D) = E(D|G)P(G) + E(D|¬G)P(¬G)
These conditional expectations can be expanded as Revenue: Revenue is conditional on G because revenue in the event of ¬G is zero. At time t, total expected revenue is the sum of revenues of already realized clicks and the revenue of the expected clcisk until u t . Let R f denote the future expected revenue until u t ,
E(R|G) = c t ρ i + E(R f |G).
Let V denotes the number of clicks until u t , 
P(G)
Total expected revenue is E(R|G)P(G): E(R|G)P(G) = P(G)c t ρ i + E(R f |G)P(G) = P(G)c t ρ i + ρ i u t j=r t j P(V = j).
Because the experiments are Bernaulli trials with success (conversion) probability of μp d , Substituting derived values of revenue and cost in Equation (11) On displaying the ad, the ad may become conversioned with a probability equal to μ, and ti will not be conversioned with a probability equal to 1 − μ . Hence the expected change in profit given a display (we ignore the minute possible change in optimal bid in a single display) E (P i(t+1) 
E(R|G)P(G) = P(G)c
